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Abstract
This note explains why inflation follows a seemingly exogenous statistical process, unrelated to
the output gap. In other words, it explains why it is difficult to empirically identify a Phillips
curve. We show why this result need not imply that the Phillips curve does not hold – on the
contrary, our conceptual framework is built under the assumption that the Phillips curve always
holds. The reason is simple: if monetary policy is set with the goal of minimising welfare losses
(measured as the sum of deviations of inflation from its target and output from its potential),
subject to a Phillips curve, a central bank will seek to increase inflation when output is below
potential. This targeting rule will impart a negative correlation between inflation and the output
gap, blurring the identification of the (positively sloped) Phillips curve.
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1. Introduction
A number of recent papers have pointed out that inflation can be approximated (and forecast) by
statistical processes unrelated to the amount of slack in the economy (Atkeson and Ohanian, 2001;
Stock and Watson, 2007, 2009; Dotsey, Fujita and Stark, 2017; Cecchetti et al., 2017; Forbes, Kirkham
and Theodoridis, 2017). The empirical disconnect between inflation and various measures of slack
has been interpreted by some commentators as evidence that the Phillips curve (a positive relation
between inflation and the output gap) has weakened or even disappeared (Ball and Mazumder,
2011; IMF, 2013; Blanchard, Cerutti and Summers, 2015).12.
Considering that most macroeconomic models used by central banks embed the Phillips curve
as one of their main building blocks, the empirical elusiveness of the Phillips curve challenges the
models’ wisdom. Or does it?
In this paper we use a standard conceptual framework to show why:
1. the empirical disconnect between inflation and slack is a result to be expected when monetary
policy is set optimally; and
2. it is also perfectly consistent with an underlying stable and positively sloped Phillips curve.
More specifically, our framework is built under the assumption that the Phillips curve always holds;
that is, inflation depends positively on the degree of slack in the economy. We also allow for
cost-push shocks that can lead to deviations from the curve, but without altering its slope. Monetary
policy is set with the goal of minimising welfare losses (measured as the sum of the quadratic
deviations of inflation from its target and of output from its potential), subject to the Phillips curve
or aggregate supply relationship. In that setting a central bank will seek to increase inflation when
output is below its potential. This targeting rule imparts a negative correlation between inflation
and the output gap, blurring the identification of the (positively sloped) Phillips curve.3
The paper is extended along four dimensions. First, it studies differences in the solutions
between discretion – our baseline case in which the monetary authority cannot commit to a future
1For a selection of the vast media comment on the issue, see articles in the Financial Times, Wall Street Journal and The
Economist or opinion piecies by Alan Blinder and Larry Summers.
2The output gap is defined as the deviation of output from its potential; in the original paper of Phillips (1958), the
focus was the negative relationship between wage inflation and unemployment
3This result follows straightforwardly from the basic New Keynesian model as derived in Clarida, Gali and Gertler
(1999), while similar results would obtain in the classic setting of Barro and Gordon (1983).
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path of inflation and the output gap – and the case of commitment, in which the authority credibly
commits to a future plan. We find that the main intuition goes through in both cases. The difference
lies in the implied properties of the statistical process for inflation generated by the optimal policy
in each case. In the simple framework studied here, the greater degree of inertia under optimal
commitment also offers one potential solution to the identification problem.
A second extension introduces shocks to the targeting rule. These shocks can be interpreted as
lags in monetary transmission; as shocks to the monetary policy instrument rule; or, in a multi-region
setting, as idiosyncratic demand shocks affecting different regions or countries within a monetary
union. We show that the relative variance of these shocks vis-a-vis the cost-push shocks is key for
the empirical identification of the Phillips curve using standard regression analysis. This result also
rationalises the findings of the vast empirical literature that uses identified monetary policy shocks
to estimate the transmission of monetary policy. Effectively, well-identified monetary policy shocks
should help in retrieving the Phillips curve.
A third extension studies a multi-region (multi-country or multi-sector) setting with a common
central bank and discusses conditions under which regional (or sectoral) data can help mitigate the
bias from the endogeneity of monetary policy. The discussion, however, also underscores some of
the limitations faced by the regional analysis.
The final extension turns to the estimation of a wage-Phillips curve and compares the identifica-
tion challenges with those faced in the price-Phillips curve.
That the empirical Phillips curve may vary with monetary policy was one of the examples given
by Lucas (1976), and similar points have been echoed in different forms by other authors since,
often focusing on the effect of monetary policy on inflation expectations.4 Similarly, Mankiw, Ball
and Romer (1988) showed how increases in average inflation rates, by changing the frequency with
which firms reset prices, could change the slope of the Phillips curve. Others have modelled a
situation when policymakers themselves set policy based on a misspecified or unidentified Phillips
Curve (Haldane and Quah, 1999; Primiceri, 2006; Sargent, Williams and Zha, 2006). In these papers,
mistakes or imperfect information on the part of policymakers can lead to changes in inflation
expectations that cause the reduced-form Phillips curve to disappear.
4For a recent example, see the explanation in Del Negro, Giannoni and Schorfheide (2015) of the ‘missing disinflation’
following the financial crisis.
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In contrast, Haldane and Quah (1999), Roberts (2006), Mishkin (2007) and Carlstrom, Fuerst
and Paustian (2009) show how good monetary policy can also endogenously offset some of the
variation in real activity, which leads to the identification issue we focus on here: the Phillips curve
disappears when monetary policy is successful. Despite these contributions, a surprisingly bulky
literature has not resisted the temptation to keep searching, against all odds, for the Phillips curve
in the data. This paper sets out, in the simplest framework possible, the identification challenge that
must be addressed, while also rationalising findings in various strands of the empirical literature
and discuss some possible solutions.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces a simple model of optimal policy em-
bedding the Phillips curve and illustrates the ’exogeneity result’ or disconnect between equilibrium
inflation and output gap under the assumption that the monetary authority cannot commit to a
future path of inflation (discretion). Section 3 illustrates the empirical identification problem. Section
4 presents and discusses extensions of the model and explains how some of those extensions map
into practical solutions to the identification problem. Section 5 contains concluding remarks.
2. Optimal inflation in the basic New Keynesian model
This section uses an optimal monetary policy framework to illustrate why, in equilibrium, one
should expect inflation to follow a seemingly exogenous process, unrelated (or negatively related)
to measures of slack.
To explain the intuition as starkly as possible, we use the canonical New Keynesian model,
as derived in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), Woodford (2003) and elsewhere. Here we closely
follow the textbook exposition from Galı´ (2008). For now, we dispense with the usual IS equation
determining aggregate demand. This equation is necessary only to determine how policy is
implemented. In the basic model it does not constrain equilibrium outcomes, so we can equivalently
consider the policymaker as directly choosing the output gap as their policy instrument. Our model
therefore consists of just two equations: a Phillips curve and a description of optimal monetary
policy.
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The (log-linearised) New Keynesian Phillips curve is given by
pit = βEtpit+1 + κxt + ut (1)
where pit is the deviation of inflation from its target; xt is the output gap, measured as the difference
between output and its potential level5 and ut is a cost-push shock that follows an exogenous AR(1)
process with persistence ρ (ut = ρut−1 + et, where et are i.i.d. and mean zero). We assume that the
Phillips curve has a strictly positive slope, denoted by κ > 0.
The Phillips curve is evidently alive and well in the model: it is the only equation making up
its non-policy block. By construction, we have a positively sloped Phillips curve. Increases in the
output gap clearly increase inflation and falls in the output gap reduce it. Nonetheless, once we
augment the model with a description of optimal monetary policy, this relationship will not be
apparent in the data. Inflation will instead inherit the properties of the exogenous shock process ut.
To show this, we assume that the policymaker sets monetary policy optimally under discretion.
Period by period, she minimises the following quadratic loss function
Lt = pi2t + λx
2
t
subject to the constraint (1) and taking expectations of future inflation as given.6 The solution to the
minimisation problem is the policymaker’s optimal targeting rule
pit = −λ
κ
xt (2)
When faced with a positive cost-push shock that creates a trade-off between the inflation and
output stabilisation objectives, the policymaker balances them, creating a negative output gap to
reduce the degree of above-target inflation. The relative weight placed on each objective depends on
the policymaker’s preference parameter λ.
The Phillips curve (1) and optimal targeting rule (2) together completely determine the path of
5In the full model derived in Galı´ (2008), this is the welfare-relevant gap between output and its efficient level.
6Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) show how minimising such a loss function is equivalent to maximising the welfare of
the representative agent in the model. But it can alternatively be motivated as a simple way to capture the preferences
enshrined in the mandates of modern (flexible) inflation targeting central banks: see Carney (2017), for example.
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inflation in the model. We can solve for equilibrium inflation by using (2) to substitute out for xt in
(1), and by iterating forward to obtain
pit =
λ
κ2 + λ(1− βρ)ut (3)
In equilibrium, inflation deviations are at all times perfectly proportional to the exogenous cost-push
shock. In other words, with a constant target, equilibrium inflation itself behaves as an exogenous
process. In the limit, when the monetary authority does not put any weight on the output gap
(λ = 0), inflation equals the target rate, a point previously made by Haldane and Quah (1999).
This behaviour is entirely consistent with recent empirical work by Cecchetti et al. (2017) and
Forbes, Kirkham and Theodoridis (2017) suggesting that inflation data in the US and the UK can
be modelled as an exogenous statistical process, unrelated to measures of slack.7 But crucially, the
basic theory is also built under the assumption that monetary policy is at all times constrained by a
working Phillips curve. There is no discrepancy between the two results. The Phillips curve may be
the correct structural model of the inflation process, but that does not mean that one should observe
it in the empirical relationship between (equilibrium levels of) inflation and the output gap.
The reason is simple. The policymaker in the model is able to set policy to achieve any desired
level of the output gap. Successful monetary policy should lean against any undesirable deviations
in output from potential, which would otherwise cause inflationary or deflationary pressures.
Precisely because monetary policy can be used to offset the effect of such output gaps on inflation,
their effect should not be visible in the data.
Optimal monetary policy does not seek to eliminate all output volatility: from (2) we can see
that in response to cost-push shocks, the policymaker will prefer to tolerate output deviations from
potential. But such shocks impart a negative correlation between inflation and output, rather than a
positive one. Again, the more successful monetary policy is in managing any trade-offs between
inflation and output, the more it will blur the underlying positive Phillips curve correlation.
To summarise, we have shown that with an optimizing monetary policy, equilibrium levels of
inflation are unrelated to measures of slack. Instead, inflation inherits the statistical properties of
7It is also consistent with the observation that in larger DSGE models such as Smets and Wouters (2007), inflation is
largely explained by exogenous markup shocks (King and Watson, 2012).
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exogenous cost-push shocks. This does not necessarily tell us that the Phillips curve is not present.
In the model, the Phillips curve exists and policymakers are completely aware of its existence. But
because they know exactly how the curve operates, they are able to perfectly offset its effects on
equilibrium inflation.8
3. Phillips curve identification
As may already be apparent from the discussion in Section 2, regression analysis will have
difficulty in recovering the Phillips curve. Figure 1 shows data simulated from the model described
by (1) and (2), with parameters calibrated as in Galı´ (2008). Specifically, the slope of the Phillips
curve is set at κ = 0.1275, the policymaker’s weight on output deviations relative to quarterly
inflation is set as λ = 0.0213, or around one-third relative to annualised inflation. The discount
factor is set to β = 0.99 and the persistence of the cost-push shock to ρ = 0.5.
Figure 1: Inflation/output gap correlation in model-simulated data
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Notes. 1000 periods of data are simulated from the model described by (1) and (2). We draw each et from a standard
normal distribution.
8Stock and Watson (2009) raise the possiblility that, despite its failure to forecast or explain the data, the Phillips curve
is still useful for conditional forecasting. They pose the question ‘...suppose you are told that next quarter the economy
would plunge into recession, with the unemployment rate jumping by 2 percentage points. Would you change your
inflation forecast?’
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Of course, there is no Phillips curve visible in the simulated data. As can be seen from the line
of best fit, a naive OLS regression of inflation on the output gap,
pit = γ1xt + εt (4)
will produce a negative parameter estimate, γˆ1 = − 16 , reflecting the targeting rule (2), rather than a
consistent estimate of the positive slope of the Phillips curve. Many papers have focused on the
difficulty of controlling for inflation expectations in Phillips curve estimation, but the problem here
is a more straightfoward one.9
The issue here is a simple case of simultaneity bias. The regressor xt is correlated with the error
term εt. The naive econometrician does not observe the Phillips curve in the data. Rather, he or she
observes equilibrium inflation and output gap outturns: which are the intersection of the Phillips
curve (1) and the targeting rule (2). In fact, the case here is an extreme one: the regressor and the
error are perfectly negatively correlated.10. The issue is completely analagous to the classic case of
simultaneity bias: jointly determined supply and demand equations.
To show the identification challenge, we first plot the two model equations in Figure 2.11 The
Phillips curve (1) is in blue, the optimal targeting rule (2) in red, while the black circles index the
policymaker’s loss function at different levels of loss. The observed inflation-output gap pairs are
the equilbrium where the two lines intersect. With no cost-push shocks to the Philips curve, the
first-best outcome of at target inflation and no output gap is feasible, so the lines intersect at the
origin.
When the upward sloping Phillips curve is subject to cost-push shocks, the equilibrium shifts to
different points along the optimal targeting path, shown in Figure 3. But with monetary policy set
optimally, there are no shifts along the Phillips curve: at all times the equilibrium remains on the
negatively sloped optimal targeting rule line. As a result, the simulated data trace out the optimal
targeting rule, not the Phillips curve. The estimated coefficient is γˆ1 = −λκ = − 16 .
The issue is that the Phillips curve is not identified. Our simple set-up has no exogenous
9See Nason and Smith (2008), Mavroeidis, Plagborg-Møller and Stock (2014) and Krogh (2015) for discussions.
10Using (3) to substitute out for pit in (2) gives the equilibirum evolution of the output gap xt = − κκ2+λ(1−βρ)ut. While
the regression error term is equal to εt = ut + βEtpit+1 = (1 +
ρλ
κ2+λ(1−βρ) )ut
11This graphical illustration of optimal discretionary policy is from Seneca (2018): we are grateful to him for making it
available to us. A similar graphical exposition also appears in Carlin and Soskice (2005).
7
variables shifting monetary policy. Worse, the only shocks are to the equation of interest, so the
estimated parameter is almost entirely unrelated to the slope of the Phillips curve.12 The problem is
the same one that arises when trying to identify a supply curve while only observing equilibrium
quantities and prices. Without any exogenous demand shifter, there is no way of doing so.
4. Extensions to the basic model and solutions to the estimation challenge
In this section we study a number of extensions to the basic model. For each extension, we
discuss whether and how it can help solving the Phillips Curve’s empirical identification problem. In
subsection 4.1, we discuss the case in which the monetary authority can commit to a path of inflation
and output gap. In subsection 4.2, we allow for shocks to the targeting rule and we discuss how
they link to the identified monetary policy shocks in the monetary policy transmission literature. In
subsection 4.3, we study a multi-region setting. In 4.4 we discuss the mapping into a wage Phillips
curve and comment on the Phillips curve in bigger models.
12Other than the fact that the slope of the Phillips curve happens to appear in the optimal targeting rule.
Figure 2: Graphical illustration of optimal monetary policy under discretion
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Figure 3: Graphical illustration of optimal discretionary policy in response to cost-push shocks
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4.1. Commitment
First, we show that our main results are unchanged when the monetary policymaker is able
to commit to a future plan for inflation and the output gap. In Sections 2 and 3 we assumed
that the policymaker was unable to commit. There are a range of practical issues that may
make commitment difficult: monetary policy committees often have changes in membership and
future policymakers may not feel bound by prior commitments and perhaps relatedly, successful
commitment requires that promises are credible, even when they are time inconsistent. Nonetheless,
the optimal commitment policy is able to achieve better outcomes in the face of cost-push shocks
than optimal policy under discretion, so it is important to know how this affects our results.
It turns out that the same intuition holds, although the precise details slightly differ. Again
following Galı´ (2008), when the policymaker instead minimises the loss function
L = E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt(pi2t + λx
2
t ) (5)
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subject to the sequence of Phillips curves given by (1) for each period. This gives a pair of optimality
conditions
pi0 = −λ
κ
x0 (6)
pit = −λ
κ
(xt − xt−1) (7)
These can be combined to give the targeting rule under commitment
pt = −λ
κ
xt (8)
where pt is the log deviation of the price level from its level in period −1. Substituting pt − pt−1 for
pit in (1) and subsituting out xt using (8) gives a difference equation in pt. Galı´ (2008) shows the
solution for this in terms of the previous period’s price level and the current period cost-push shock.
Iterating backwards and then taking the first difference gives equilibrium inflation
pit =
δ
1− δβρ (ut − (1− δ)
t−1
∑
i=0
δt−1−iui) (9)
where δ ≡ ((λ(1+β)+κ2)−((λ(1+β)+κ2)2−4βλ2)0.5)2λβ .
Equilibrium inflation under optimal commitment policy depends solely on the cost-push shock
process. The equilibrium path is quite different to that under discretion, however. At any point in
time inflation displays history dependence, depending on the entire history of cost-push shocks
rather than just the one in the current period.
Simple regressions will again fail to uncover the Phillips curve. The only difference is that under
commitment, the optimal targeting rule imposes a negative correlation between the output gap and
the price level. The relationship between inflation and the output gap in the simulated data shown
in Figure 4 is noisier, but shows no sign of the Phillips curve embedded in the model. The OLS
estimate of γ in (4) gives the coefficient γˆ1 = −0.085.
At least in the simple framework here, the history-dependence of optimal commitment policy
also suggests a straightforward solution to the identification problem. From (7), the equilibrium
output gap will be correlated with its own lagged values, which can therefore be used as an
10
instrument. Intuitively, the policymaker chooses to create an output gap even after the cost-push
shock has disappeared. They commit to do so in order to achieve better inflation outcomes when
the shock originally occurs. The policymaker therefore optimally reintroduces the positive Phillips
curve relation that is absent under optimal discretion. As a result, in the simple case here, a suitable
choice of instrument will be able to recover the true Phillips curve slope.
Figure 4: Inflation/output gap correlation in model-simulated data: optimal commitment
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Notes. 1000 periods of data are simulated from the model described by (1) and (7). We draw each et from a standard
normal distribution.
4.2. Shocks to the targeting rule
The previous sections have illustrated how successful monetary policy might mask the underlying
structural Phillips curve in the data. We now show that the opposite is also true in our model: if
monetary policy is set far from optimally, the Phillips curve is likely to reappear.
So far we have assumed policymakers can implement monetary policy by directly choosing
their desired observable output gap each period. But alas in practice, policymaking is not quite
so simple. In empirical studies we observe lags bewteen changing policy and its impact on the
output gap and inflation, which means that in practice central banks are inflation forecast targeters
(Svensson, 1997; Haldane, 1998). Forecast errors will therefore inject noise into the targeting rule.
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Potential output is unobservable, so the output gap must be estimated (with error). And the effect
of the policy instruments actually available (typically the central bank policy rate and forward
guidance on its future path; as well as quantitative easing) on the target variables is also unknown.
Errors from any of these sources will insert noise into the desired balance between inflation and
output gap deviations. These various shocks to the targeting rule correspond closely to the typical
interpretations of identified monetary policy shocks in the vast emprical literature on this topic
(Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 1996, 1999; Romer and Romer, 2004; Olivei and Tenreyro, 2007;
Cloyne and Hu¨rtgen, 2016). That literature is able to identify a positively correlated response of
inflation and the output gap to monetary policy shocks, in line with the results below.
Returning to optimal policy under discretion, we model implementation errors by simply adding
an AR(1) shock process et to the targeting rule (2) to give
pit = −λ
κ
xt + et (10)
where et = ρeet−1 + ζt and ζt is a zero-mean i.i.d. with variance σ2e .13 We can show that equilbrium
inflation and the output gap now both have an additional term proportional to et. Respectively,
they are given by pit = s1λut + s2κet and xt = −s1κut + s2(1− ρe)et, where s1 ≡ 1λ(1−ρ)+κ2 and
s2 ≡ κλ(1−ρe)+κ2 .
With shocks to the targeting rule, neither equation is identified. The equilibrium values of
inflation and the output gap both depend on a combination of both shocks. Consequently, if either
equation is estimated by OLS, its regressor will be correlated with the regression error term and the
resulting parameter estimate inconsistent. In particular, it follows from substituting the equilibrium
values of pit and xt into the definition of the OLS estimator in the regression (4) that
plim(γˆ) =
plim( 1T ∑
T
t=1 xtpit)
plim( 1T ∑
T
t=1 x2t )
=
−λ
κ
s1
s2
σ2u
σ2u+σ
2
e
+ (1− βρe)κ σ
2
e
σ2u+σ
2
e
s1
s2
σ2u
σ2u+σ
2
e
+ (1− βρe)2 σ2eσ2u+σ2e
(11)
The size of the simultaneity bias to each equation depends on the relative variances of the shocks.
Figure 5 plots simulated data for three cases. We set ρe = 0.5 and set the other parameters as before.
13Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) and Svensson and Woodford (2004) show in the basic New Keynesian model that
when there are policy control lags that mean all variables are predetermined in advance, up to an unforecastable shock,
the optimal targeting rule will take exactly this form, where et is the forecast error.
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First, the red circles show the case where the cost-push shock has a variance 100 times larger than
the targeting rule shock. These look almost identical to the case with only a cost-push shock: the
circles trace out the targeting rule. Second, the green circles show the case when the shocks have
equal variance. The slope is still negative, but flatter. The final case gives the cost-push shock a
variance 100 times smaller than the targeting rule shock, and the data trace out a positively sloped
line.
Figure 5: Inflation/output gap correlation in model-simulated data: optimal discretion with shocks to the targeting rule
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Notes.1000 periods of data are simulated from the model described by (1) and (10). The green circles show the case when
each et and ζt is drawn from a standard normal distribution. The blue circles show the case when each et is drawn from
an N(0,10) distribution and the red circles each ζt is instead drawn from an N(0,10) distribution.
Looking at the regression coefficients in Table 1, in the first two cases these are both strongly
influenced by the endogenous policy response embodied in the optimal targeting rule. It also makes
little difference whether or not the econometrician correctly controls for inflation expectations, which
also enter the Phillips curve. In the third case however, the regression coefficient turns positive. The
estimate is actually upward biased in specification 5, which omits inflation expectations. Once these
are controlled for, the bias becomes very small. The regression correctly identifies the slope of the
Phillips curve to four decimal places.
The reason the bias disappears is straightforward. When cost-push shocks have a relatively low
13
Table 1: OLS regressions of inflation on the output gap in the simulated data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
σ2u
σ2e
= 100 σ
2
u
σ2e
= 100 σ
2
u
σ2e
= 1 σ
2
u
σ2e
= 1 σ
2
u
σ2e
= 0.01 σ
2
u
σ2e
= 0.01
LHS variable pit pit − Etpit+1 pit pit − Etpit+1 pit pit − Etpit+1
xt −0.1667 −0.1805 −0.0873 −0.0792 0.2523 0.1275
Notes. Table shows the OLS regression coefficients of OLS for the shock distributions described in the notes to Figure 5.
Specifications (2), (4) and (6) (perfectly) control for inflation expectations by subtracting from the dependent variable the
true value of βEtpit1 . The true slope of the Phillips curve is κ = 0.1275, while the true slope of the optimal targeting rule
is − λκ = −0.1667.
Figure 6: Graphical illustration of optimal discretionary policy in response to targeting-rule shocks
π 
x 
π = −
λ
κ
x + 𝜖1 
 
π = −
λ
κ
x + 𝜖2 
Phillips curve 
π = κx 
Targeting rule 
π = −
λ
κ
x 
π = −
λ
κ
x + 𝜖3 
π = −
λ
κ
x + 𝜖4 
variance, most of the variation in the simulated data arises from the shocks to the targeting rule.
With the Phillips curve stable, these movements in the targeting rule now trace out the Phillips
curve, as shown graphically in Figure 6.
4.3. Regional Phillips curves
Partly to avoid the difficulties associated with identifying the Phillips curve at the national level, a
number of authors have estimated Phillips curves at a more disaggregated, regional or sectoral level
14
(Fitzgerald and Nicolini, 2014; Kiley, 2015; Tuckett, 2018; Vlieghe, 2018). In this subsection we show
that in an extended version of the basic model, this may also help the econometrician to identify the
aggregate Phillips curve.
The key to identification is that at the regional level, the endogenous response of monetary policy
to demand shocks is switched off, ameliorating the simultaneity bias in estimating aggregate Phillips
curves. This point was made by Fitzgerald and Nicolini (2014) as motivation for their estimation of
Phillips curves at a regional level. The same logic can explain why the Phillips curve may be more
evident in countries within a monetary union such as the euro area.
We assume that the aggregate Phillips curve (1) continues to hold, but that aggregate inflation
and the aggregate output gap also depend on the weighted average of inflation and the output gap
in each of n regions
pit =
n
∑
i=1
αipi
i
t (12)
xt =
n
∑
i=1
αixit (13)
where regional inflation is determined by a regional Phillips curve analogous to (1)
piit = βEtpi
i
t+1 + κix
i
t + u
i
t (14)
where the idiosyncratic cost-push shocks uit = ρu
i
t−1 + e
i
t and e
i
t are zero-mean and i.i.d over time,
but potentially correlated across regions. We must also specify how idiosyncratic demand shocks
and aggreate monetary policy affect the regional output gap with an equation analogous to the IS
curve in the basic New Keynesian model, given by
xit = Etx
i
t+1 − σ−1(it − Etpiit+1 − rit) (15)
where the idiosyncratic demand shocks are given by rit = ρrr
i
t−1 + e
i
r and eir are zero-mean and i.i.d
over time, but potentially correlated across regions. The equations can be aggregated together to
15
give the usual aggregate IS relation
xt = Etxt+1 − σ−1(it − Etpit+1 − rt) (16)
We therefore allow inflation and the output gap are determined partly by idiosyncratic shocks to
each region, but restrict the monetary policy rate it to be the same across all n regions.
We next denote for any regional variable its (log) deviation from the aggregate as zˆit = z
i
t −
∑ni=1 αiz
i
t. We can then subtract (1) from (14) to give a Phillips curve in terms of log deviations from
aggregate inflation.
pˆiit = βEtpˆi
i
t+1 + κi xˆ
i
t + uˆ
i
t (17)
Subtracting (16) from (15) gives an equivalent IS curve
xˆit = Et xˆ
i
t+1 + σ
−1(Etpˆiit+1 + rˆ
i
t) (18)
Monetary policy is set (under discretion) by minimising the same aggregate period loss function as
in Section 2, subject to the aggregate Phillips curve (1).14 Policy therefore follows the same targeting
rule (2) depending solely on aggregate variables.15
The crucial difference to the identification problem at the regional level is that while monetary
policy perfectly offsets the aggregate demand shocks, rt = ∑ni=1 r
i
t, it does not respond at all to the
idiosyncratic regional deviations from that average, rˆit. The regressor in the Phillips curve equation
xˆit is now affected by exogenous demand shocks that do not enter the regional Phillips curve. As a
result, the endogeneity problem is mitigated.
For each region, we can verify that one solution to the model described by (17) and (18) is
pˆiit = c1(1− ρ)uˆit + c2κi rˆit (19)
14This differs from the monetary policy that would be welfare-optimal in the model, since welfare would also be
lowered by dispersion in prices within a region, even if average inflation was zero. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2001) show
in the context of an open economy model that the welfare-optimal policy would minimise a loss function that included
the sum across countries of the squared deviations of inflation, rather than the square of the sum of deviations.
15Although to ensure determinancy, the policymaker’s instrument rule will need to respond to idyiosyncratic variables.
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and
xˆit = c1ρσ
−1uˆit + c2(1− ρrβ)rˆit (20)
where c1 ≡ 1(1−ρ)(1−ρβ)−ρκiσ−1 and c2 ≡
σ−1
(1−ρr)(1−ρrβ)−ρrκiσ−1 .
16 Unlike aggregate inflation, which
evolves in line with the exogenous shocks to the Phillips curve, regional inflation also depends
on idyiosyncratic demand shocks. In the simplest case when the shocks are entirely transitory
(ρ = ρr = 0), the equilibrium output gap will be independent of the idyiosyncratic cost-push shocks
uˆit and a simple regression of pˆi
i
t on xˆ
i
t will give a consistent estimate of κi.
Away from that special case, inflation expectations present a separate challenge to identifying
regional Phillips curves. With ρ > 0 or ρr > 0, there will be omitted variable bias unless the
econometrician can control for the effect of regional inflation expectations. While possible in
principle, reliable data are likely to be less readily available than at the national level. There
is perhaps likely to be more chance of success when estimating at the country level within a
single multi-country monetary authority. A second difficulty at the regional level is that while
the specification will help mitigate the bias from the endogeneity of national monetary policy,
insuffucient cross-sectional variation in the regional data will lead to imprecise estimates of κi.
4.4. The wage Phillips curve
While identification of the price Phillips curve is complicated by the endogenous response of optimal
monetary policy, the focus of the original Phillips study was the correlation between wage inflation
and unemployment in the UK. Especially in the UK, a number of researchers have had more success
in finding the latter relationship. In this subsection we comment on how optimal monetary policy
maps into the original wage Phillips curve relationship between wage inflation and unemployment.
Intuitively, one might expect the wage Phillips curve to be less vulnerable to identification issues
related to the endogeneity of monetary policy, since wage inflation is one step removed from the
price-inflation targeting remit of most central banks.
As well as a different dependent variable (wage inflation rather than price inflation), the
16While this is one solution, depending on how policy is implemented, there may be a multiplicity of equilbria. It
is beyond the scope of this paper to study those, so we assume that the policymaker’s instrument rule is able to rule
them out. In practice, this will involve responding to deviations of regional inflation or regional output gaps from their
equilibrium values, even when those deviations have no impact on aggregate inflation or the aggregate output gap.
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typical wage Phillips curve attempts to explain inflation using variation in unemployment or the
unemployment gap, rather than the output gap. Using unemployment in the equation is unlikely to
solve the identification issues arising from the behaviour of monetary policy for at least two reasons.
First, many central banks’ remits explicitly specify unemployment or employment as one of
their (secondary or dual) target variables. As such, they will optimally set policy to close any gap
between unemployment and its natural rate, unless there is a trade-off between that goal and their
inflation targets, in which case they will seek to balance the two goals, as was the case with the
output gap in Section 2. Monetary policy will therefore blur the structural relationship between
inflation and the unemployment gap in a similar way. Second, even for central banks without an
explicit mandate to minimise fluctuations in employment, when there is comovement between the
output gap and the unemployment gap, policy will often implicitly seek to stabilise employment.17
There are, however, reasons to think that using wage inflation as the dependent variable might
lessen some of the identification problems. Nominal wage rigidities can be incorporated into the
basic model in an analogous way to price rigidities, as introduced by Erceg, Henderson and Levin
(2000). With both wage and price stickiness, some shocks, such as innovations to firms’ desired
price-markups, will lead to a wedge between the rate of price inflation and the output gap, but
not between the rate of wage inflation and the output gap. Since inflation targeting central banks
typically target price inflation, policymakers may respond by adusting the output gap to achieve
their desired trade-off with price inflation. But doing so would lead to variation in wage inflation
operating via the wage Phillips curve. Put differently, the equilibrium output gap will be a function
of the exogenous shocks hitting the economy. But if those shocks only directly affect the price
Phillips curve and not the wage Phillips curve, then the output gap will be correlated with the error
term in the former but not the latter, which will be consistently estimated.
The wage Phillips curve may not face quite as severe problems, but there remain limits to how
easily it can be identified under optimal monetary policy. First, while there may be some shocks
that only affect the price Phillips curve, there are likely to be several more that affect both curves
(for a given output gap). Wage mark-up shocks will increase both price and wage inflation relative
to the prevailing output gap. Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) show that shocks to household
17Galı´ (2011) shows how the basic framework can be easily extended to include unemployment in a way that closely
resembles the output gap in the basic model.
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consumption or leisure preferences, or to total factor productivity, will conversely move price and
wage inflation in opposite directions for a given output gap. Since the inflationary impact of these
shocks will lead policymakers to attempt to lean against them via the output gap, this will induce a
correlation between the output gap and the shocks affecting the wage Phillips curve (for a given
output gap). The direction of the bias will differ according to the shock, but the equation will in
general not be identified.
Second, even if price inflation shocks are particularly prevalent, many typical examples of such
shocks, such as changes in oil prices, have relatively transitory effects on price inflation. Since
monetary policy is typically thought to have its peak effect on inflation with some lag, attempting
to offset very transitory shocks may not be possible. As a result, policymakers are perhaps less
likely to respond to the very shocks that would otherwise have helped econometricians idenfity the
wage Phillips curve. Conversely, when transitory shocks are affecting price inflation, wage inflation
can sometimes give a better signal of underlying price pressures, which may lead policymakers to
behave at times as if they were targeting wage inflation.18
In addition to nominal wage rigidities, larger macroeconomic models of the type used for policy
analysis in central banks usually have a range of other frictions, additional factors of production
and a richer dynamic structure.19 The same logic we have outlined in this paper also complicates
single-equation identification of the Phillips curve in data simulated from larger models. Given
their richer structure and wider vairety of shocks, if one were able to estimate the full structural
model and there was enough variation in the data, then it would be possible to recover any Phillips
curve relationship. But precisely because we do not know the true model of the economy, such
an approach may be less robust to misspecification. Single equation OLS estimation, meanwhile,
will be biased by the effect of monetary policy just as in the simple model. Monetary policy that
is successful in targeting inflation and in closing the output gap will be definition be successful in
offsetting the effect of any shocks that affect inflation via the Phillips curve.20
18In addition, the welfare optimal policy in models with sticky wages typically involves placing a positive weight on
avoiding wage inflation (Erceg, Henderson and Levin, 2000). But we are not aware of any central banks who officially
target wage inflation in practice.
19See for example Edge, Kiley and Laforte (2010); Burgess et al. (2013); Brubakk and Sveen (2009); Adolfson et al. (2013)
for descriptions of models used respectively at the Federal Reserve Board, the Bank of England, Norges Bank and the
Riksbank.
20Identifying a Phillips curve is further complicated in larger models by the fact that a stable, structural relationship
between the output gap and firms’ marginal costs (and therefore inflation) may not exist. The reduced-form Phillips curve
correlation typically varies for different shocks.
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5. Conclusion
We use standard analytical framework to explain why inflation follows a seemingly exogenous
statistical process, or, in other words, why the Phillips curve cannot be easily identified with
macroeconomic data. In the framework, a monetary authority minimizes welfare losses, measured
as deviations of inflation and output from their targets, subject to a Phillips curve. This leads the
authority to follow an optimal targeting rule in which it seeks to increase inflation when the output
gap decreases. This imparts a negative relation between inflation and the output gap that blurs the
identification of the positively sloped Phillips curve. In equilibrium, inflation inherits the statistical
properties of any cost-push shocks affecting the Phillips curves (e.g., energy price shocks, exchange
rate changes, and so on).
We show that shocks to the targeting rule are key for the identification of the Phillips curve.
These targeting shocks can take the form of monetary policy shocks in a Taylor rule or, in a multi-
region setting or a multi-country monetary union, idiosyncratic demand shocks affecting the various
regions or countries in different ways. In a univariate regression analysis, if the relative variance
of these shocks is sufficiently high, vis-a-vis the variance of cost-push shocks, the slope of the
Phillips curve can be identified. Similarly, in a VAR specification that allows for the identification of
monetary policy shocks, the positive relationship between inflation and output gap can be distilled.
We have also shown how the simple framework here can jointly rationalise several empirical
findings on the Phillips curve. First, it should be weaker in periods when there are large cost shocks
– such as the 1970s – and when monetary policy is relatively successful in achieving its targets –
as in the inflation targeting era. Second, wage Phillips curves should be more evident in the data
that price Phillips curves. And third, the Phillips curve relationship should appear stronger in
disaggregated panel data than in aggregate data.
To summarise, the paper explains the identification problem posited by the estimation of Phillips
curves; rationalises findings in the empirical literature and discusses possible solutions to the
identification problem.
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